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INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses significant judicial and legislative developments
of interest to the Georgia civil trial practitioner occurring during the
survey period of this publication.'
II.

LEGISLATION

Signed by Governor Deal on May 3, 2011, House Bill 242 rewrites and
replaces the Georgia Evidence Code' as codified in Title 24 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.). 4 The Act loosely
conforms Title 24 to the Federal Rules of Evidence and makes the
changes effective for any motion, hearing, or trial commencing on or
after January 1, 2013.'
III.

CASE LAW

A.

Choice of Law
In Carroll Fulmer Logistics Corp. v. Hines,' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the substantive law of Georgia applied to a wrongful
death and survival action filed in Georgia but arising from a Florida
tractor-trailer wreck.' Utilizing the public policy exception 8 to the
traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti,' the court determined that the
Florida Wrongful Death Act,o which specifically provides for the
calculation of wrongful death damages based upon the value of the

1. For analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure law during the prior survey
period, see Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of Georgia

Law, 62 MERCER L. REv. 339 (2010).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 99 (to be codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 24).
3. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2010).
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 24 § 2.
5. Id. § 1. Because of this effective date, any substantive changes to the Georgia
Evidence Code will be addressed in the next survey period.
6. 309 Ga. App. 695, 710 S.E.2d 888 (2011).
7. Id. at 695, 698, 710 S.E.2d at 890-91.
8. Under this exception, a Georgia court will not apply another state's substantive law
if that state's law contravenes public policy, notwithstanding the fact that the tort at issue
occurred in that other state. Id. at 696, 710 S.E.2d at 890.
9.

See Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 279 Ga. 808, 809, 621 S.E.2d 413, 414 (2005)

(stating that under the doctrine of lex loci delicti a tort action is governed by the
substantive law of the state where the tort was committed).
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.26 (2011), available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/
index.
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decedent's life to the statutory survivors and prohibits damages for predeath physical and mental anguish," differed sufficiently from Georgia
law so as "to render the Florida Act in contravention of Georgia public
policy."" The court of appeals held that "the trial court correctly ruled
that Georgia rather than Florida substantive law applies to the wrongful
death and survival actions." 3
Dismissals,Renewals, and Service of Process
In Teel v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP," the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia, applying Georgia law, ruled
that a plaintiff demonstrated "just enough" reasonable diligence to
perfect service after the statute of limitations expired, despite her initial
failure to ensure her process server was court-appointed and her use of
ordinary United States mail to petition for an order appointing a special
process server once the error was discovered.1b
In Kilgore v. Stewart,16 the plaintiff originally sued two parties,
voluntarily dismissed them one at a time, and then filed a renewal
action against both parties pursuant to Georgia's renewal statute.17
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs first dismissal was
ineffective because the plaintiff failed to obtain a court order permitting
voluntary dismissal of fewer than all of the parties to the action, as
required by Georgia law." Because a prerequisite to filing a valid
renewal action is a valid dismissal of the original action, and because
neither defendant was validly dismissed from the original action by the
time the plaintiff filed the renewal action, the court reasoned that the
renewal action should likewise have been dismissed.19
In Ehrhardt v. Manuel,2 0 the court of appeals reemphasized that a
plaintiff is entitled to file one, and only one, renewal action after the
B.

12.

§ 768.21.
Carroll, 309 Ga. App. at 698, 710 S.E.2d at 891.

13.

Id.

11.

See FLA. STAT.

14. No. 4:10-CV-114 (CDL), 2010 WL 5462511 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2010).
15. Id. at *2-3. In an interesting procedural footnote, the court explained that Georgia
law required the court to review the issue of reasonable diligence de novo at the motion to
dismiss stage, and that it was not required to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. Id. at *2 n.1. The court also observed that when a trial court
treats the issue of reasonable diligence de novo, it makes factual determinations that
should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id.
16. 307 Ga. App. 374, 705 S.E.2d 209 (2010).
17. Id. at 374, 705 S.E.2d at 209; O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (2007).
18. Kilgore, 307 Ga. App. at 375, 705 S.E.2d at 209-10 (quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260
Ga. App. 709, 710, 580 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2003)); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-21 (2006).
19. Kilgore, 307 Ga. App. at 375, 705 S.E.2d at 210.
20. 306 Ga. App. 6, 700 S.E.2d 910 (2010).
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expiration of the applicable statutes of limitation. 2 1 The plaintiffs in
Ehrhardttimely filed suit, voluntarily dismissed their case, and then refiled the suit after the running of the applicable statutes of limitation.
After no written orders were filed in the renewal action for five years,
the case was dismissed by operation of law.22 The plaintiff sought to
re-file again, arguing that the one-renewal limitation found in O.C.G.A.
§ 9-2-61" should not be applicable to cases filed after a dismissal
pursuant to the "five-year rule."" The court of appeals rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, holding that the plaintiffs "were only entitled to one
renewal after the running of the statutes of limitation" despite the fact
that the second dismissal was pursuant to the five-year rule.2 5
The court of appeals dealt a similar blow to the plaintiff in Williams
v. Patterson.2 6 In Williams, service on the original action took nearly
a year. The plaintiff then dismissed the case and re-filed it shortly
thereafter, but was again unable to timely effect service. The defendant
filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, asserting, among other things,
that the plaintiff's action was barred by lack of service of process."
The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had not been reasonably
diligent in effecting service, observing that there had been at least two

21. Id. at 7, 700 S.E.2d at 912.
22. Id. at 6, 700 S.E.2d at 911.
23. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (2007).
24. Ehrhardt,306 Ga. App. at 7, 700 S.E.2d at 911. There are two versions of the fiveyear rule. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-60(b)-(c) (2007); and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e) (2006). The
relevant portions of O.C.G.A. § 9-2-60 provide the following:
(b) Any action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which
no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand
dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff.
(c) When an action is dismissed under this Code section, if the plaintiff recommences the action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed
action shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-60(b)-(c). O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e) provides the following:
Any action in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall
automatically stand dismissed, with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff.
For the purposes of this Code section, an order of continuance will be deemed an
order. When an action is dismissed under this subsection, if the plaintiff
recommences the action within six months following the dismissal then the
renewed action shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the
original action.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e).
25. Ehrhardt,306 Ga. App. at 7, 700 S.E.2d at 912. The court further held that this
result was mandated by prior precedent. See id. at 7, 700 S.E.2d at 911-12 (citing White
v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 229 Ga. App. 73, 74, 493 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1997)).
26. 306 Ga. App. 624, 703 S.E.2d 74 (2010).
27. Id. at 625-26, 703 S.E.2d at 75-76.
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lengthy periods during which the plaintiff made no attempt to perfect
service despite being previously notified of the defendant's lack of service
defense." The court also rejected the argument that, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e),2 9 the plaintiff should have been afforded an
additional twelve months." The court found that O.C.G.A. § 33 -7-11(e)
simply described "the amount of time that a plaintiff must continue
diligent attempts to serve a defendant while proceeding with litigation
against the plaintiff's own [uninsured motorist] carrier," and it did not
"creat[e] an expansion of the time in which personal service accomplished outside the limitation period will relate back to the time of filing
of plaintiffs complaint."a"
However, in Robinson v. Boyd,32 the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that untimely service in an originally-filed action
cannot serve as grounds for dismissal in a subsequent renewal action.3 3
The court determined that the renewal statute was clear and that
permitting the defendant to raise the defense of untimely service in the
original action would "essentially ask [the court] to rewrite an unambiguous statute."34

28. Id. at 627-28, 703 S.E.2d at 76-77.
29. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e) (Supp. 2011).
30. Williams, 306 Ga. App. at 628-29, 703 S.E.2d at 78. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e)
authorizes service by publication for the purpose of obtaining a nominal judgment against
a striking driver so that the injured party may proceed against his own uninsured motorist
insurance carrier. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e). In relevant part, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e) provides
the following:
In cases where the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damage is
known and either or both are named as defendants in any action for such injury
or damages but the person resides out of the state, has departed from the state,
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself to avoid
the service of summons, and this fact shall appear by affidavit to the satisfaction
of the judge of the court, and it shall appear either by affidavit or by a verified
complaint on file that a claim exists against the owner or driver in respect to
whom service is to be made and that he is a necessary or proper party to the
action, the judge may grant an order that the service be made on the owner or
driver by the publication of summons.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e).
31. Williams, 306 Ga. App. at 629, 703 S.E.2d at 78.
32. 288 Ga. 53, 701 S.E.2d 165 (2010).
33. Id. at 56, 701 S.E.2d at 168. The court in Robinson reaffirmed its holding in Hobbs
v. Arthur, 264 Ga. 359, 360-61, 444 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1994) ("llinasmuch as diligence in
perfecting service of process in an action properly refiled under [O.C.G.A.] § 9- 2 -61(a) must
be measured from the time of filing the renewed suit, any delay in service in a valid first
action is not available as an affirmative defense in the renewal action."). Robinson, 288
Ga. at 56, 701 S.E.2d at 168.
34. Robinson, 288 Ga. at 56, 701 S.E.2d at 168. The court likewise rejected defendant's
arguments that the substantial delay of service in the original case constituted a due
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C.

Statutes of Limitation and Statutes of Repose
In a unanimous opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals in Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones &
Goulding, Inc.3 ' and held that the six-year statute of limitations for
written contracts,3 6 rather than the four-year statute of limitations for
oral or implied contracts," applies where a claim is based on profesIn Newell, the
sional malpractice arising out of a written contract.
defendant designed a purportedly defective automobile shredding facility
for the plaintiff, and the work for the facility was governed by a "Draft
Scope of Work" document.3 ' The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach
of contract and professional malpractice within six years-but not within
four years-of the defendant's last purported negligent act or breach.40
The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs
claims were subject to the four-year statute of limitations for actions
based upon an "implied promise or undertaking."' The trial court
denied the motion, ruling that a fact issue remained whether there was
a written contract triggering the six-year statute of limitations. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the four-year
statute of limitations applied, regardless of the written contract, because
the plaintiffs claims were essentially for the breach of an implied, not
written, promise to perform professional services according to the
applicable standard of care.42
The supreme court reversed, holding that "the threshold inquiry is to
determine whether a written agreement actually exists between the
parties such that any implied duties sued upon would have grown
directly out of the existence of the written contract itself." If there is

process violation and that the plaintiffs action should be barred by the equitable doctrine
of laches. Id. at 57-58, 701 S.E.2d at 168-69.
35. 288 Ga. 236, 703 S.E.2d 323 (2010).
36. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (2007) ("All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be
brought within six years after the same become due and payable.").
37. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 (2007) ("All actions upon open account, or for the breach of
any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied
promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action
accrues.").
38. Newell Recycling, 288 Ga. at 237, 703 S.E.2d at 325.
39. Id. at 236, 703 S.E.2d at 324.
40.

Id.

41. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25.
42. Newell Recycling, 288 Ga. at 236-37, 703 S.E.2d at 324-25; see also Jordan Jones
& Goulding, Inc. v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc., 299 Ga. App. 294, 298-99, 682 S.E.2d
666, 670 (2009), rev'd, 288 Ga. 236, 703 S.E.2d 323 (2010).
43. Newell Recycling, 288 Ga. at 237-38, 703 S.E.2d at 325.

2011]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

365

a complete written contract, then the six-year statute of limitations
applies "regardless of whether the alleged breach stems from the express
terms of the agreement or duties that are implied in the agreement as
a matter of law."'
In Deen v. Stevens,4 5 the supreme court rejected an equal protection
constitutionality challenge to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b)," which specifically
exempts medical malpractice claims from the general tolling provisions
for plaintiffs who are "legally incompetent because of mental retardation
or mental illness. 4 7 In finding that the statute survived rational basis
scrutiny, the court closely tracked the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a related case.4 8
In a 4-3 decision, the supreme court held in Rosenberg v. Falling
Water, Inc.4 that when an injury occurs outside of the statute of repose
period, a defendant cannot be equitably estopped from utilizing a statute
of repose defense even when the plaintiff alleges a fraudulent concealment of a defect claim.so In Rosenberg, the plaintiff filed suit against
a construction company for personal injuries arising out of a deck
collapse." The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the
eight-year statute of repose" for personal injuries resulting from
improvements on real property because the deck collapse and personal
injuries occurred more than eight years after the defendant completed
the deck." The plaintiff argued that the defendant should be equitably

44. Id. at 238, 703 S.E.2d at 326.
45. 287 Ga. 597, 698 S.E.2d 321 (2010).
46. Id. at 597, 698 S.E.2d at 322; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b) (2007).
47. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b); see also Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 643-44, 423 S.E.2d 653,
657 (1992) (holding that "mental retardation or mental illness" includes mental
incompetence). Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91 tolls the limitations period where a person
suffers a disability after his or her claim accrues. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91 (2007).
48. Stevens, 287 Ga. at 601, 698 S.E.2d at 324; see Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223,
1238 (11th Cir. 2010). Although the Eleventh Circuit was considering the Equal Protection
Clause under the United States Constitution, the Georgia Supreme Court could
comfortably rely on its analysis "[blecause the protection provided in the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution is coextensive with that provided in Art. I, Sec.
I, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, [courts] apply them as one." Stevens, 287 Ga.
at 601, 698 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Favorito v. Handel, 285 Ga. 795, 797, 684 S.E.2d 257,
261 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. 289 Ga. 57, 709 S.E.2d 227 (2011).
50. Id. at 57, 709 S.E.2d at 228.
51. Id. at 58, 709 S.E.2d at 229.
52. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51(a) (2007).
53. Rosenberg, 289 Ga. at 58-59, 289 S.E.2d at 229.
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estopped" from asserting the statute of repose defense because the
defendant fraudulently concealed a defect in the deck construction.5 5
The majority held that the statute of repose is unassailable when the
In so
injury itself occurred outside of the statutory time period.
holding, the court distinguished Rosenberg from cases where the injury
occurred during the period of liability, but the plaintiff was deterred
from filing suit until after the statute of repose had run due to the
In essence, the majority
defendant's fraudulent concealment.
concluded that the plaintiff never had a cause of action because his
injury occurred after the statute of repose had run; therefore, there was
no cause of action for the defendant to fraudulently conceal." Chief
Justice Hunstein, in her dissent, argued that completely precluding
equitable estoppel in cases such as this "subvert[ed] the purpose of the
equitable estoppel doctrine by incentivizing fraud.""
In Campbell v. Altec Industries, Inc.," the Georgia Supreme Court,

on a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit," clarified the time at which the ten-year statute of
repose6 2 begins to run in product liability actions.63 The Eleventh
Circuit certified the following question to the Georgia Supreme Court:
In a strict liability or negligence action, does the statute of repose
in [O.C.G.A.] § 51-1-11' begin running when (1) a component part

54.

See O.C.G.A. § 24-4-27 (2010).

55. Rosenberg, 289 Ga. at 60, 709 S.E.2d at 230.
56. Id. at 61, 709 S.E.2d at 231.
57. Id. at 60, 709 S.E.2d at 230; see Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21, 21-22, 522
S.E.2d 522, 523 (1999); Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354,357,367 S.E.2d 128,132 (1988).
58. Rosenberg, 289 Ga. at 60, 709 S.E.2d at 230.
59. Id. at 66, 709 S.E.2d at 234 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (citing Hill, 186 Ga. App.
at 357, 367 S.E.2d at 131-32). Justice Hunstein wrote the following:
One who fraudulently conceals his or her negligence and thereby deters another
from preventing or avoiding an injury in the first place is, if anything, more
culpable than one who fraudulently conceals the cause of an injury after the injury
occurs. Likewise, the rationale for equitable estoppel applies with equal if not
greater force when both the delayed but preventable injury and the resultant late
filing of an action are attributable to the defendant's alleged misconduct.
Id. at 67, 709 S.E.2d at 234.
60. 288 Ga. 535, 707 S.E.2d 48 (2011) [hereinafter Campbell Ill.
61. See Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 605 F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter

Campbell 11.
62.
63.

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (2011).
Campbell II, 288 Ga. at 535, 707 S.E.2d at 48-49.

64. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(bX2) (2011). The statute of repose provision provides that "[no
action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten
years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing
or otherwise bringing about the injury." Id.
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causing an injury is assembled or tested, (2) a finished product, which
includes an injuring component part, is assembled, or (3) a finished
product, which includes an injuring component part, is delivered to its
initial purchaser?"
The supreme court provided a straightforward answer: "the statute of
repose . .. begins to run when a finished product is sold as new to the
intended consumer who is to receive the product .

...

In so holding,

the Georgia Court of Appeals previous ruling in Johnson v. Ford Motor
Co. 6 1 was overruled by the supreme court."
Generally speaking, parties may contract for limitations periods in
addition to, or in lieu of, statutory limitations periods." In Thornton
v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,'o the Georgia Supreme
Court considered one such contractual limitations period in a homeowner's insurance policy that required suits under the policy to be
"started one year after the date of the loss," but also provided that a loss
was not payable until "60 days after [the insurance company] receiveld]
[the insured's] proof of loss . . . ."" The insurance company ultimately

denied the plaintiffs claim for fire damage. The plaintiff filed suit more
than one year after the date of the fire, contending the suit was timely
because the one-year limitations period should be tolled during the sixtyday period in which a claim is nonpayable under the terms of the
insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendant.72 Both the court of appeals and the supreme court affirmed." In affirming the court of appeals, the supreme court held that
the insurance policy was unambiguous; the limitations period began to
run on "the date of the loss," not on the date that the claim became due
and payable." The date of the loss was clearly the date of the fire."
The supreme court further rejected the plaintiff's arguments that failing
to toll the limitations period during the sixty-day loss payment period
was unfair and that the two provisions in the insurance policy amounted
to an ambiguity that should be construed in favor of the insured.76

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Campbell 1, 605 F.3d at 842.
Campbell II, 288 Ga. at 535, 707 S.E.2d at 48-49.
281 Ga. App. 166, 171, 637 S.E.2d 202, 206 (2006).
Campbell II, 288 Ga. at 537, 707 S.E.2d at 50.
Order of United Commercial v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947).
287 Ga. 379, 695 S.E.2d 642 (2010).
Id. at 380, 695 S.E.2d at 643.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381, 695 S.E.2d at 644.
Id.
Id. at 383, 384-85, 695 S.E.2d at 645-46.
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D.

Tort Issues
Courts construing Georgia law made several significant premises
liability decisions during the survey period. In Kent v. Callaway
Gardens Resort, Inc.," the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia, interpreting Georgia law, determined that summary
judgment was inappropriate in a slip and fall case that occurred on a
wet floor at the Callaway Gardens butterfly center." The court first
held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the defendant's
constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition-the plaintiff
produced evidence that the defendant had not established reasonable
inspection procedures and that the hazard would have been discovered
The court then found that the
during a reasonable inspection."
plaintiff produced evidence sufficient to show a genuine question of fact
whether the allegedly hazardous condition actually caused the child's
fall." In so finding, the court emphasized the role of the jury in
determining causation, noting that the "[p]laintiff's evidence on
causation, while certainly disputed, does not rise to the level of
speculation such that her claim should be decided by a lone judge rather
than a jury of her peers."" The district court found that "the Georgia
Supreme Court. . .intended for these issues to be resolved by a jury and
not by summary adjudication."8 2
The Georgia Court of Appeals reached the opposite result in Kane v.
Landscape Structures, Inc.,' affirming a grant of summary judgment
to the defendant manufacturer." In Kane, a nine-year-old boy was
seriously injured when he fell from the top of a piece of playground
equipment manufactured by the defendant." The court of appeals held
that the boy "appreciated the obvious risk of falling that is associated
with climbing to high places, and he voluntarily chose to assume the
risk."86 As evidence that the boy understood and voluntarily assumed

77. No. 4:09-CV-70 (CDL), 2010 WL 2528321 (M.D. Ga. June 18, 2010).
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id. at *3-4. The court also found that the defendant failed to point the court to any
evidence establishing the negligence of the child who fell and was injured. Id. at *4.
80. Id. at *5.
81. Id. The plaintiff produced evidence that the child's pants were wet immediately
after she fell, and an affidavit by the injured child stated that the floor was slippery and
wet where she fell. Id.
82. Id. at *6.
83. 309 Ga. App. 14, 709 S.E.2d 876 (2011).
84. Id. at 20, 709 S.E.2d at 881.
85. Id. at 14, 709 S.E.2d at 877.
86. Id.
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the risk of climbing on the equipment, the court noted, among other
things, that the boy testified his mother warned him against climbing
things, and he knew the particular piece of playground equipment from
which he fell was not intended for climbing." Judge Barnes dissented
and argued that, for the assumption-of-the-risk defense to apply in this
case, the child must have "had a particularized and subjective awareness
of the risk involved in climbing on this playground equipment," rather
Judge
than simply an understanding of the general risk of falling.8
Barnes concluded that whether the child "appreciated the danger in
climbing the [playground equipment] is a question of fact for a jury to
determine.""
In Freeman v. Eichholz," the court of appeals affirmed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney in a legal
malpractice action, concluding that the plaintiff could not have prevailed
in her underlying premises liability claim."1 First, the court was
required to determine whether the plaintiff, who was injured while
visiting a prison inmate, was an invitee or a licensee. 92 In resolving
this issue of apparent first impression, the court held that, because
inmate visitors and the state penal system mutually benefit from
prisoner visitation, the plaintiff should be considered an invitee rather
than a licensee." The court also held, however, that although the trial
court incorrectly found that the plaintiff was a licensee, the trial court
correctly found that the defendant did not breach its duty of ordinary
care to ensure the plaintiff's safety.94 The court held that no "evidence
[existed] from which a jury could infer that the defendants in the
underlying suit had superior knowledge of the hazard" about which the
plaintiff complained." Because the plaintiff could not have prevailed
in the underlying action, she was consequently unable to show that her
attorney's actions were the proximate cause of her claimed injuries."
The plaintiff in Morris v. Harley Davidson Motor Co." was seriously
injured, and his wife was killed, when a tire on the motorcycle they were

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 15-16, 709 S.E.2d at 878.
Id. at 23, 709 S.E.2d at 883 (Barnes, P.J., dissenting).
Id.
308 Ga. App. 18, 705 S.E.2d 919 (2011).

91. Id. at 18, 705 S.E.2d at 921.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 20-21, 705 S.E.2d at 922-23.
Id. at 21-22, 705 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 22, 705 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 23, 705 S.E.2d at 924.
Id. at 23-24, 705 S.E.2d at 924.
No. 3:09-CV-74 (CDL), 2010 WL 2723079 (M.D. Ga. July 7, 2010).
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riding failed." The plaintiff exceeded the motorcycle's "Gross Vehicle
Weight Rating" and was also pulling a trailer-both practices against
which the owner's manual warned; however, the plaintiff admitted he
never read the manual and never saw the warnings on the motorcycle
itself." In its opinion, the court of appeals distinguished between two
types of failure to warn cases under Georgia law, stating that a plaintiff
may allege that a manufacturer "(1) . .. failled] to adequately communicate the warning to the ultimate user or (2) . . . fail[ed] to provide an

adequate warning of the product's potential risks."Oo Where, as in
this case, the relevant question is whether the manufacturer failed to
adequately and reasonably communicate the warning to the user, the
court held the fact that the user did not see or read the warning does not
bar the user's recovery.oi The court ultimately concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to both "the adequacy and
reasonableness of Harley-Davidson's means and method of conveying the
warnings" and proximate causation."o2
The court of appeals also rendered a decision sharply limiting the
scope of recovery pursuant to the Georgia Dram Shop Act (GDSA) 103
in Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC.10 ' This decision was
reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court in July 2011.105 However, the
court of appeals decision does continue to offer some valuable insight
into the court's approach to the Dram Shop Act generally.
In Flores, the court of appeals held that the GDSA did not apply to
sales of closed containers of alcohol by convenience stores or other
retailers of packaged alcohol.10 The GDSA imposes liability on any
"person . .. who knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages
to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that

98. Id. at *1.
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id. at *3 (quoting Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 218 Ga. App. 74, 75, 460 S.E.2d

532, 534 (1995)).
101. Id. The court again emphasized the importance of having a jury determine
disputed issues in this type of a failure to warn case, such as "whether or not the
manufacturer was negligent in failing to place a warning in such position, color and size
print or to use symbols which would call the user's attention to the warning or cause the
user to be more likely to read the label and warning than not." Id. (quoting Camden Oil
Co. v. Jackson, 270 Ga. App. 837, 841, 609 S.E.2d 356, 359 (2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
102. Id. at *4.
103. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000).
104. 304 Ga. App. 333, 696 S.E.2d 125 (2010), rev'd, 289 Ga. 466, 713 S.E.2d 368
(2011).

105. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 289 Ga. 466, 713 S.E.2d 368 (2011).
106.

Flores, 304 Ga. App. at 333, 696 S.E.2d at 126.
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such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle . . . .
Despite this
"plain and unambiguous" language, the court of appeals found that
applying the GDSA to sellers of packaged alcohol would be "wholly
impracticable."'o The court reasoned that juries would be required to
speculate about factors stipulated in the GDSA, such as when and where
the purchaser of the alcohol would consume it, and whether the seller of
the alcohol would have any basis for knowing the purchaser would be
driving soon."0 '

Because such "speculation or guesswork .

.

. is an

improper basis for imposing liability," the court simply held that the
Georgia General Assembly did not intend the GDSA to apply to
packaged alcohol sales, even where sufficient evidence existed as to each
element of the GDSA.110
In Flores, the court of appeals assumed, without deciding, that the
plaintiffs had raised evidence "sufficient to raise factual issues under the
GDSA."n In its reversal of Flores, the supreme court determined that
because the GDSA "uses the terms 'sells, furnishes, or serves' alcohol in
the disjunctive, it is clear that it was intended to encompass the sale of
an alcoholic beverage at places other than the proverbial dram
shop."H2 The court also noted that the "upshot of the [clourt of
[alppeals' decision" was that "a convenience store cannot be held liable
for selling closed or packaged alcoholic beverages to a noticeably
intoxicated adult under any set of circumstances.""'
The supreme
court squarely rejected this notion in favor of the concept that each
GDSA case "must rise or fall on its own facts."'114

E.

Damages and Remedies
In Cavalier Convenience, Inc. v. Sarvis," the court of appeals
concluded that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33,
as amended in 2005,' requires the trier of fact to apportion its award of damages among multiple
liable persons, even if the plaintiff bears no fault for the injury or

107. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b).
108. Flores, 304 Ga. App. at 336, 696 S.E.2d at 127.
109. Id. at 336, 696 S.E.2d at 127-28; O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b).
110. Flores, 304 Ga. App. at 336, 696 S.E.2d at 128.
111. Id. at 334, 696 S.E.2d at 126.
112. 289 Ga. at 467, 713 S.E.2d at 369; O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b).
113. 289 Ga. at 468, 713 S.E.2d at 370.
114. Id. at 469, 713 S.E.2d at 371.
115. 305 Ga. App. 141, 699 S.E.2d 104 (2010), cert. granted.
116. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (Supp. 2011).
117. See Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33 (Supp. 2011)).
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damages claimed."1 s The plaintiff contended that the statute only
mandates apportionment when the plaintiff is alleged to have been at
fault to some degree for the injuries, and apportionment is authorized
only after a reduction equal to the plaintiffs fault."' The court
disagreed. 120 Focusing on the plain language of the statute, the court
held that when "damages are to be awarded in an action brought against
more than one person for injury to person or property," whether or not
the plaintiff is responsible to some degree for the injury, "the trier of fact
'shall ...

apportion its award of damages among the persons who are

liable according to the percentage of fault of each person."',21 Accordingly, for now, apportionment among defendants is required even where
it is undisputed that the plaintiff is not at fault.122
In Barnett v. Farmerl23 the court of appeals required apportionment
of damages to an immune party as a matter of physical precedent.124
In this case, a husband and wife brought claims for personal injury
arising out of an automobile collision.12' The trial court declined to
charge the jury to apportion damages to the husband-driver if the jury
found that the negligence of both the defendant and the husband
contributed to the wife's injuries.12 ' The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's decision and held that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 requires a jury
instruction on the apportionment of damages to the husband because
there was evidence from which the jury could conclude the husband was
negligent.'12 The court reasoned that apportionment did not violate
interspousal immunity because it "in no way requires [the wife] to file
suit against her husband, but instead, precludes her from recovering
from [the defendant] that portion of her damages, if any, that a trier of
fact concludes resulted from the negligence of her husband."l 28
Finally, in SRB Investment Services LLP v. Branch Banking & Trust

Co. ,129 the supreme court clarified that all four factors set forth by the

118. Cavalier,305 Ga. App. at 145, 699 S.E.2d at 107.
119. Id. at 144, 699 S.E.2d at 107.
120. Id. at 145, 699 S.E.2d at 107.
121. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
122. See Cavalier,305 Ga. App. at 145, 699 S.E.2d at 107. The Georgia Supreme Court
has granted certiorari but has not declared an opinion on this issue. Id. at 141, 699 S.E.2d
at 104.
123. 308 Ga. App. 358, 707 S.E.2d 570 (2011).
124. Id. at 362, 707 S.E.2d at 573-74; see GA. APP. CT. R. 33(a) (requiring that decisions
in which judges do not concur fully are physical, not binding, precedent).
125. Barnett, 308 Ga. App. at 358, 707 S.E.2d at 571.
126. Id. at 360, 707 S.E.2d at 573.
127. Id. at 362, 707 S.E.2d at 573-74.
128. Id. at 362, 707 S.E.2d at 574.
129. 289 Ga. 1, 709 S.E.2d 267 (2011).
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court in Bishop v. Patton"'0 need not be proven by a party seeking an
interlocutory injunction. 3 1
F

Attorney Fees
In O'Connor v. Bielski, 32 the supreme court disapproved of the 1965
decision in Taylor v. Sharpe33 and held that a landowner was not
entitled to an award of attorney fees in a partition action against his
former fianc6e where the action sought neither to preserve nor enhance
their common property.134 Georgia courts have recognized a narrow
exception to the rule that attorney fees may only be awarded as provided
by statute or contract.135 Pursuant to this narrow exception, "a court
of equity may award attorney fees to a party who at his own expense has
maintained a successful suit for the protection or increase of common
property or a common fund . . . ."13 However, "this exception applies
only where the [legal] proceedings are deemed to have been conducted
entirely for the common benefit of all.""' In addition, this "allowance
[of attorney fees] will not be made in favor of . .. parties who in good
faith interpose a [substantial] real contest against other parties to the
partition action." 3 1 In O'Connor, the landowner's position was "directly adverse" to his former fianc6e's, and the landowner "sought neither to
preserve nor enhance their common property" through the partition
action. 39 Accordingly, the landowner was not entitled to attorney
fees.140
In PN Express, Inc. v. Zegel,141 the court of appeals held that when
a defendant's liability is vicarious, Georgia's apportionment statute 4 2
does not apply between the defendant and the agent-employee
tortfeasor.14 3 The court reached this result because "[glenerally, where
a party's liability is solely vicarious, that party and the actively-

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

288 Ga. 600, 604, 706 S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (2011).
SRB Inv. Seros., 289 Ga. at 5 & n.7, 709 S.E.2d at 271 & n.7.
288 Ga. 81, 701 S.E.2d 856 (2010).
221 Ga. 282, 144 S.E.2d 390 (1965).
O'Conner, 288 Ga. at 83-84 & n.2, 701 S.E.2d at 858 & n.2.
Id. at 83, 701 S.E.2d at 858.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citations, punctuation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 84, 701 S.E.2d at 858.
Id.
304 Ga. App. 672, 697 S.E.2d 226 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
PN Express, 304 Ga. App. at 680, 697 S.E.2d at 233.

374

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

negligent tortfeasor are regarded as a single tortfeasor." 44 For that
reason, where the defendant trucking company was allegedly liable for
the acts of the truck driver, the apportionment statute did not require
the jury to apportion fault between the trucking company and the truck
driver."'

G.

Jury and Trial
In Anthony v. Gator Cochran Construction,Inc.,1 6 the supreme court

held that neither a party's failure to object to a verdict form on the face
of which the potential for a contradictory verdict was apparent, nor a
party's failure to object to a contradictory verdict upon the return of that
verdict, waived the party's right to challenge the verdict as "contradictory and repugnant" on appeal."' The court observed that "a verdict
that is contradictory and repugnant is void, and no valid judgment can
be entered thereon."" 8 In reaching this result, the court overruled two
decisions from the court of appeals:149 Brannan Auto Parts v. Raymark

Industriesso and Ford Motor Co. v. Tippins.si
In Kesterson v. Jarrett,"' the court of appeals held that a trial court,
under specific circumstances, has the discretion to "limit a severely
injured plaintiff's presence during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial
. . . ."9sa Specifically, the court held the following:
a trial court has the discretion to limit a severely injured plaintiffs
presence during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial when, after an
evidentiary hearing upon a written motion and after an opportunity to
observe the plaintiff, the court makes the following factual findings in
a written order: (1) the plaintiff is severely injured; (2) the plaintiff
attributes those injuries to the conduct of the defendant(s); (3) there is
a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs presence in the courtroom
will cause the jury to be biased toward the plaintiff based on sympathy
rather than the evidence such that the jury would be prevented or
substantially impaired from performing its duty; (4) the plaintiff is
unable to communicate with counsel or to participate in the trial in any

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 288 Ga. 79, 702 S.E.2d 139 (2010).
147. Id. at 80, 702 S.E.2d at 140-41.
148. Id. at 79, 702 S.E.2d at 140 (citation, punctuation, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
149. Id. at 80, 702 S.E.2d at 141.
150. 183 Ga. App. 82, 357 S.E.2d 807 (1987).
151. 225 Ga. App. 128, 483 S.E.2d 121 (1997), cert. granted.
152. 307 Ga. App. 244, 704 S.E.2d 878 (2010).
153. Id. at 250, 704 S.E.2d at 884.
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meaningful way; and (5) the plaintiff is unable to comprehend the
proceedings.1 s4
The court acknowledged that "[a] party's right to be present during trial
is a cherished right, one which must be diligently safeguarded,"
reassuring that due process protects that right.155
However, the court reasoned that, under the above circumstances, "the
plaintiff's presence is not truly an exercise of his or her right to be
present, because the plaintiff is incapable of making . . . a conscious
choice . . . . [T]he plaintiff functions almost as an exhibit, as a piece of

evidence.""' For that reason, the court held that the trial court had
discretion to exclude a plaintiff from the courtroom during the trial's
liability phase because the plaintiff had a "profoundly limited cognitive
function" and was not even "able to respond to yes or no questions with
an eyeblink.""'

H. Discovery, Evidence, and Testimony
In Baker v. Wellstar Health System, Inc.,' the supreme court held
that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996,"9 which preempts Georgia's procedural requirements for ex
parte contact between defense counsel and a litigant's treating physicians,1"o does not extend to preempt the substantive right of medical
privacy conferred by Georgia law.161 Such privacy protects a litigant
from opposing counsel's unfettered ex parte contact with an unknown
array of the litigant's treating physicians.1 6 2 Therefore, any qualified
protective order entered by a trial court allowing for such ex parte
contact
should state with particularity: (1) the name(s) of the health care
provider(s) who may be interviewed; (2) the medical condition(s) at
issue in the litigation regarding which the health care provider(s) may
be interviewed; (3) the fact that the interview is at the request of the
defendant, not the patient-plaintiff, and is for the purpose of assisting

154. Id. (footnote omitted).
155. Id. at 251, 704 S.E.2d at 884-85.
156. Id. at 250, 704 S.E.2d at 884.
157. Id. at 246, 250, 704 S.E.2d at 881, 883-84 (punctuation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
158. 288 Ga. 336, 703 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
159. Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
160. See Moreland v. Austin, 284 Ga. 730, 733, 670 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2008).
161. Baker, 288 Ga. at 338, 703 S.E.2d at 604.
162. See id.
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defense counsel in the litigation; and (4) the fact that the health care
provider's participation in the interview is voluntary .... In addition,
... trial courts should consider whether the circumstances. . . warrant

requiring defense counsel to provide the patient-plaintiff with prior
notice of, and the opportunity to appear at, scheduled interviews or,
alternatively, requiring the transcription of the interview by a court
reporter at the patient-plaintiff's request."'
In Walker v. Cromartie,"' appellants challenged, in part, the
constitutionality of the expert affidavit requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1.16'
The challenge, which was based on the statute's purported

violation of the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause"'
and Due Process Clause,16 ' and the Georgia Constitution's separation
of powers clause"6 s and uniformity clause, 161 was rejected by the
supreme court.o7 0

I. Appellate Issues
The case of Cooper v. Spotts171 resolved a conflict in the caselaw
regarding a trial court's jurisdiction to rule on a motion for new trial
when an application or appeal has been filed and the appellate court's
jurisdiction to consider an appeal while a motion for new trial is

pending.'72

Overruling Department of Human Resources v. Hol-

land,"' the court of appeals held that, when a motion for new trial is
pending, the trial court is not divested of jurisdiction to rule on that
motion by the filing of a discretionary application, and likewise, the
appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal until the trial
17
court has disposed of the motion.4

In Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus,"' the defendant attempted to
directly appeal a trial court's discovery order by arguing, inter alia, that

it was immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.176

163. Id. at 339-40, 703 S.E.2d at 605.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
170.
171.

287 Ga. 511, 696 S.E.2d 654 (2010).
Id. at 511, 696 S.E.2d at 656; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2011).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend V.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4(a).
Walker, 287 Ga. at 512-13, 696 S.E.2d at 657.
309 Ga. App. 361, 710 S.E.2d 159 (2011).

172.
173.

See id. at 364, 710 S.E.2d at 161.
236 Ga. App. 273, 511 S.E.2d 628 (1999).

174.
175.
176.

Cooper, 309 Ga. App. at 364, 710 S.E.2d at 161.
305 Ga. App. 450, 699 S.E.2d 600 (2010).
Id. at 452, 699 S.E.2d at 602.

169.
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The collateral order doctrine "permits appeals from a small category of
decisions 'that are 1(i)] conclusive, [(ii)] that resolve important questions
separate from the merits, and [(iii)] that are effectively unreviewable on
appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.""" The court
of appeals adopted the United States Supreme Court's reasoning from
Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter,"' and held that discovery orders
failed to meet the final prong in the collateral order test because there
are a number of alternative methods of obtaining review of discovery
orders, and because deferring review of a discovery order until after final
judgment in a case would not meaningfully harm the policy objective of
full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients.179
J. Immunity / Bars to Action
The Georgia Supreme Court held, in Schorr v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.," that, in a class action, satisfaction by the representative
plaintiffs of a statutory presuit requirement to make a written demand
for liquidated damages constitutes satisfaction of that requirement on
The general rule, articulated in Barnes
behalf of all class members.'
v. City of Atlanta,182 allows a class representative to satisfy precondiIn Barnes, the court
tions for suit on behalf of the entire class."
emphasized that the plaintiffs' satisfaction of the pre-suit requirement
was sufficient to put the defendant on notice of its potential class action
liability."'

Likewise, in Schorr, the named plaintiffs' individual

demands to Countrywide for it to pay them the statutorily mandated
$500 in liquidated damages was sufficient to put Countrywide on notice
of its potential class action liability for all similarly situated claimants. 8 s
Under Schorr, a class representative may generally satisfy any presuit
However, exceptions to
condition on behalf of all class members."
that rule may exist where there are "genuinely unique statutory requirements," such as where the statute "prohibits [the] utilization of a class
action, [or] expressly requires individual [satisfaction of the precondition

177. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm., 514 U.S. 35,
42 (1995)).
178. See 130 S. Ct. 599, 606-07 (2009).
179. Expedia, 305 Ga. App. at 453, 699 S.E.2d at 603.
180. 287 Ga. 570, 697 S.E.2d 827 (2010).
181. Id. at 573, 697 S.E.2d at 829.
182. 281 Ga. 256, 637 S.E.2d 4 (2006).
183. Id. at 258, 637 S.E.2d at 6; Schorr, 287 Ga. at 573, 697 S.E.2d at 829.
184. 281 Ga. at 257-59, 637 S.E.2d at 6.
185. 287 Ga. at 572, 637 S.E.2d at 829.
186. Id. at 573, 697 S.E.2d at 829.
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for suit]." 8 7 Over a dissenting opinion, the majority found that the
statute at issue involved no such exceptions."'
The court of appeals expanded access to the courts and eliminated the
wasteful pursuit of likely futile administrative remedies in Georgia
Society of Ambulatory Surgery Centers v. Georgia Department of
Community Health,'" which involved Georgia Society of Ambulatory
Surgery Centers's (GSASC) challenge to the Georgia Department of
Community Health's (DCH) attempt to collect information from surgery
centers beyond what was allowed by law.9 o The DCH sought dismissal on the ground that GSASC had not exhausted its administrative
remedies because the surgery centers were entitled to an administrative
hearing under the Administrative Procedures Act' and an appeal of
any adverse decision to the Commissioner of the DCH.192 The court of
appeals held, however, that GSASC's undisputed failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies did not preclude judicial review of the
agency's action because (1) resorting to the available remedies would be
futile, and (2) exhaustion is not required where the plaintiff challenges
In support of its determinathe agency's authority or power to act.'
tion of futility, the court reasoned that it was "highly implausible" that
the Commissioner would abandon his position that the agency had power
to seek the information at issue, conclude that the agency's conduct was
Although an impartial
illegal, and find for the surgery centers."
administrative law judge would preside over the initial administrative
hearing, the Commissioner would owe that judge's decision no deference
in his review of an appeal taken from the administrative hearing."9 s
The court of appeals, in McCobb v. Clayton County,"' reversed the
trial court's dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity where a
plaintiff alleged the following: (1) the county police officer undertook a
police chase in reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures,
thereby causing the decedent to run off the road and hit a tree; and (2)

187. Id. (quoting Barnes, 281 Ga. at 258, 637 S.E.2d at 6) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
188. Id.
189. 309 Ga. App. 31, 710 S.E.2d 183 (2011) [hereinafter GSASCI.
190. Id. at 31, 710 S.E.2d at 184.
191. O.C.G.A. tit. 50, ch. 13, art. 1 (2009 & Supp. 2011).
192. GSASC, 309 Ga. App. at 37, 710 S.E.2d at 188; O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-13(a)(1), -17(a)
(2009).
193. GSASC, 309 Ga. App. at 37, 710 S.E.2d at 188-89.
194. Id. at 38, 710 S.E.2d at 189.
195. Id. at 39, 710 S.E.2d at 189-90.
196. 309 Ga. App. 217, 710 S.E.2d 207 (2011).
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under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51,197 the county's sovereign immunity was
waived up to the amount of its liability insurance for any injuries arising
out of the use of a motor vehicle."'s In so doing, the court rejected
dicta from Peeples v. City of Atlanta9 9 that suggested an injury does
not arise out of the officer's use of a motor vehicle unless the officer's
vehicle physically contacts the suspect's vehicle.200 The court also held
that, although O.C.G.A. §§ 36-92-1 to -5201 specifically provide for the
waiver of sovereign immunity for a local government officer's negligence,
a county's sovereign immunity is waived under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)202
for an officer's reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures
when engaging in a police chase.2 03
In Morgan v. Horton,204 the court of appeals held that O.C.G.A. § 126-148205 conferred immunity to a landowner for a motor vehicle
collision purportedly caused by excessive smoke from a prescribed land
burn. 20 6 The landowner relied entirely upon a local forestry service
office's chief ranger, who had more than thirty years of experience and
was certified to conduct and supervise prescribed burns.2 07 Except for
several brief periods, the ranger monitored the fire while on site and
ensured that it never left the burn area.208 Since the ranger was
experienced in conducting controlled burns and closely monitored the
fire, the court held that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-6-148, the landowner
was protected from liability.20 9
Insurance
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Adams,21 0 the supreme court
held that when an uninsured motorist (UM) insurer is liable up to policy
limits for the amount of the insured's damages minus other "available
coverages," 21 1 and when the liability insurer devotes a portion of its
K

197. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2005).
198. McCobb, 309 Ga. App. at 218, 710 S.E.2d at 209-10.
199. 189 Ga. App. 888, 377 S.E.2d 889 (1989).
200. McCobb, 309 Ga. App. at 219, 710 S.E.2d at 210; see Peeples, 189 Ga. App. at 890,
377 S.E.2d at 892-93.
201. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-92-1 to -5 (2006).
202. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d) (2011).
203. McCobb, 309 Ga. App. at 221, 710 S.E.2d at 211.
204. 308 Ga. App. 192, 707 S.E.2d 144 (2011).
205. O.C.G.A. § 12-6-148 (2006).
206. Morgan, 308 Ga. at 192, 707 S.E.2d at 147.
207. Id. at 193, 707 S.E.2d at 147-48.
208. Id. at 196, 707 S.E.2d at 149-50.
209. Id.
210. 288 Ga. 315, 702 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
211. Id. at 316, 702 S.E.2d at 900; O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)(I) (Supp. 2011).
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coverage to pay an insured's hospital lien, the amount of available
coverages is not reduced by the amount of that hospital lien.212 In
other words, as the court summarized the rule in Adams's companion
case, "[hospital] liens could not be used to reduce a tortfeasor's available
coverage and [thereby] increase the coverage of an insured's uninsured

motorist carrier.n213
The decision in Adams centered on the language in O.C.G.A. § 33-711(bX1XDXiiXI),"" which provides that "available coverages" shall be
reduced in the same amount by which the liability coverage has been
reduced below the limits of coverage "by reason of payment of other
claims or otherwise . . . ."2
The court held that a liability insurer's
payment of an insured's hospital lien did not constitute a payment of
"other claims or otherwise," because "[w]hen a tortfeasor's liability
carrier pays a hospital lien to a hospital standing in the shoes of the
insured, it does so for the direct benefit of the insured.,2 16 Therefore,
the court reasoned, if a liability insurer paid off the insured's hospital
lien and the insured collected the amount of that hospital lien from the
uninsured motorist (UM) insurer, the insured would receive "double
recovery" in the amount of the hospital lien. 217 For that reason, the
insured was not permitted to subtract the amount of the hospital lien
from available coverages before subtracting available coverages from his
total damages when determining the amount owed by the UM insurer.218
In Sapp v. Canal Insurance Co.,219 the supreme court held that the
Motor Carrier Act 220 governs an insurance contract issued to a known
motor carrier even if the policy does not indicate it is a motor carrier
policy and the motor carrier has failed to obtain the permit for motor
carrier operation required by Georgia law. 22 ' The court reasoned that
"the policy purpose of the Act [is] to protect the motoring public," so "any
negative consequences arising from noncompliance with the Act by the

212.
213.
214.
opinion
(2000).
appears
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Adams, 288 Ga. at 320, 702 S.E.2d at 902.
Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 288 Ga. 322, 322, 704 S.E.2d 755, 756 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1XD)(ii)(I) (Supp. 2011). At the time the court issued its
in Adams, the language at issue was located at O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(DXii)
The general assembly has since amended the statute so that the language now
at O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX1XDXii)(I).
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX1XD)(iiXD.
Adams, 288 Ga. at 319, 702 S.E.2d at 902.
Id. at 318-19, 702 S.E.2d at 902.
Id. at 320, 702 S.E.2d at 902.
288 Ga. 681, 706 S.E.2d 644 (2011).
O.C.G.A. tit. 46, ch. 7 (2004 & Supp. 2011).
Sapp, 288 Ga. at 687, 706 S.E.2d at 650.
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insured motor carrier or its insurer should be suffered by one or both of
the noncompliant parties rather than by the innocent motoring
public."222 For this reason, when the policy at issue did not purport to
be a motor carrier policy and restricted coverage to incidents occurring
within fifty miles of Tifton, Georgia, the Motor Carrier Act nonetheless
authorized the insured's direct action against the insurer and invalidated the policy's radius-of-use provision.2
In VFH Captive Insurance Co. v. Pleitez," 4 the court of appeals held
that although captive insurance companies225 are specifically governed
by the Captive Insurance Company Act (CICA), 226 they are also
governed by the Uninsured Motorist Statute 227 to the extent that the
statute does not conflict with the CICA.228 In reaching that conclusion,
the court relied on O.C.G.A. § 33-41-3(b), 22 9 which establishes that
"[i]nsurance policies ... issued by a captive insurance company for. . .
motor vehicle accident insurance shall be in conformity with all
minimum requirements for coverages and coverage amounts established
by the state for such types of insurance." 230 The court held the
Uninsured Motorist Statute's requirement that the insurer either supply
UM coverage or obtain a written rejection of such coverage from the
insured 2 31 is a minimum requirement within the meaning of O.C.G.A.
§ 33-41-3(b), and therefore applies to captive insurance companies.2 32
The court suggested, but did not hold, that some other provisions of the
Uninsured Motorist Statute, such as the requirement that "insured" be
defined broadly to include resident relatives of the named insured,2 33
might conflict with the CICA and may therefore be inapplicable to
captive insurance companies.2 34

222. Id. at 685, 706 S.E.2d at 648-49.
223. Id. at 681, 706 S.E.2d at 646.
224. 307 Ga. App. 240, 704 S.E.2d 476 (2010).
225. A captive insurance company only insures vehicles for hire. Id. at 240, 704 S.E.2d
at 477.
226. O.C.G.A. tit. 33, ch. 41 (2000 & Supp. 2011).
227. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp. 2011). This statute is not officially labeled the
"Uninsured Motorist Statute," but is commonly referred to by that name, as in the instant
decision. See, e.g., Pleitez, 307 Ga. App. at 241, 704 S.E.2d at 478.
228. Pleitez, 307 Ga. App. at 242-43, 704 S.E.2d at 479.
229. O.C.G.A. § 33-41-3(b) (2000).
230. Id. at 242, 704 S.E.2d at 478 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); O.C.G.A. § 33-41-3(b).
231. See O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3).
232. Pleitez, 307 Ga. App. at 242, 704 S.E.2d at 478.
233. See O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(B).
234. Pleitez, 307 Ga. App. at 241, 704 S.E.2d at 478.
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In Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency v. Godfrey,"' the
court of appeals held that a municipality may legally provide motor
vehicle insurance to its employees through a self-insurance program that
offers narrower UM coverage than the coverage prescribed by the
Uninsured Motorist Statute.2 3 6 The legislature has waived sovereign
immunity "only to the limits of the coverage provided [by the municipality]."237 In other words, because the legislature has waived a municipality's sovereign immunity only to the extent that the municipality
thinks it fit to provide insurance coverage, "any attempt to require . . .
coverage under [the Uninsured Motorist Statute] would run afoul of [the
municipality's] sovereign immunity."2 3" For that reason, although the
City of Newnan's decision to provide uninsured motorist coverage but not
underinsured motorist coverage contravened the Uninsured Motorist
Statute, sovereign immunity barred the insured's attempt to obtain UM
coverage that conformed to the statute.2 39

In Lankford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,24 0 the
court of appeals issued a rather harsh opinion underscoring the
importance of providing insurers with written notice of an automobile
wreck as soon as reasonably possible, and thus affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant. 2 41' The defendant was both the striking
driver's liability insurer and the plaintiff's UM insurer. Within days of
the collision causing the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant wrote the
plaintiff a letter referencing the striking driver's liability policy. One
month later, the plaintiffs employer placed the defendant on notice of a
subrogation interest for medical expenses it had paid on the plaintiffs
behalf Roughly one year after the wreck, the plaintiff discussed his
injuries and workers' compensation claim with the defendant's agent.
The plaintiff then filed suit just before the expiration of the statute of
limitations and provided written notice to the defendant that he may be
entitled to UM coverage.24 2 The defendant thereafter filed a motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to give State
Farm written notice in accordance with his policy, which provided that
he "must give us or one of our agents written notice of the accident or
loss as soon as reasonably possible." 24 3 The plaintiff countered that
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238.
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240.
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243.

305 Ga. App. 130, 699 S.E.2d 377 (2010).
Id. at 132-33, 699 S.E.2d at 378.
Id. at 133, 699 S.E.2d at 378.
Id. at 133, 699 S.E.2d at 379.
Id. at 134, 699 S.E.2d at 379.
307 Ga. App. 12, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010).
Id. at 15-16, 703 S.E.2d at 440.
Id. at 12-13, 703 S.E.2d at 438.
Id. at 13, 703 S.E.2d at 438.
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the defendant had actual notice of the collision and had first contacted
the plaintiff about the collision only days after it had occurred. 2"
On appeal, the court distinguished the defendant's actual knowledge
of the collision from the plaintiff's obligation to provide written notice
under the policy, holding that "notification by an unrelated third party
such as [the striking driver] did not relieve [the plaintiff] of his separate,
contractual obligation to provide notice . . . under his own policies."24 5
The court went on to note that it "know [s] of no authority requiring an
insurer to cross-reference the names of all parties involved in an
accident to determine whether they, too, have insurance through the
insurer; instead the insurer is entitled to rely upon its contractual notice
provisions."24
IV.

CONCLUSION

The above cases and legislation have, in the Authors' estimation, most
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia over the
survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive
of all legal developments on this topic.
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